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The Sahel has long been characterised by political violence, 
border permeability, territorial disputes, traffics of all kinds, 
and ethnic-sectarian violence. Since 2011 and particularly 
following the French military intervention in Mali in 2013, 
instability and insecurity have also been catalysed by the 
resurgence of Islamic terrorist groups. Mixing with 
traffickers networks, separatist movements and other 
conflicts, they have transformed the Sahel into a crisis hub. 
This has attracted attention from Europeans and their 
American allies, as terrorism and related mobility issues 
directly affect them. However, such a complex social and 
territorial environment complicates traditional security 
responses that would contain the threat by 
compartmentalising it. Instead, it requires a comprehensive 
framework of effective solutions, adapted to the geography 
of the region and the fluidity of terrorist and other illegal 
activities. This has to be supported by a coherent 
sponsorship at the international level and implemented by 
well-coordinated regional, national and local actors at the 
regional level.  
One year after the inception of a G5 Joint Force, the High-
Level Conference on the Sahel in February 2018 in Brussels 
highlighted the international community’s growing 
awareness of the importance of the Sahel for the stability of 
Africa and Europe. It constituted a breakthrough in unlocking 
international support to the operationalisation of the Joint 
Force. It also confirmed long-established European 
commitment to supporting Sahel authorities. This European 
political sponsorship contrasts with the Trump 
administration’s difficulty to engage with the Sahel countries 
and, more broadly, Africa.  
Nonetheless, in the context of an upsurge of terrorist 
activities in the Sahel, armed attacks against the French and 
United Nations (MINUSMA) missions in Ouagadougou and 
Timbuktu, reminded the international community of the 
persistence of security threats in the region and the need for 
a more adequate response. 
Executive Summary 
> Established in 2014 to foster concrete responses to 
transnational security challenges in the Sahel-
Saharan strip, the G5 Sahel – composed of Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – has 
progressively asserted itself as both a regional 
forum and interlocutor on development and 
security cooperation in the region. 
 
> While only a second-rate concern for the United 
States, security in the Sahel has become a priority 
of the European Union’s global security agenda, 
and allowed the EU to assume a leadership role, 
with France playing a crucial part. 
 
> Even though the French and EU-sponsored project 
of a G5 Sahel Joint Force  has been endorsed by the 
international community in 2017, difficulties to 
reach an agreement on its mandate and 
operationalisation have caused a transatlantic rift.  
 
> Despite the gradual implementation of a 
comprehensive response to terrorism through the 
G5, the persistence of the security crisis should 
incite further empowerment of national and local 
authorities while increasingly integrating the Joint 
Force with two other missions, Barkhane and the 
MINUSMA.  
 
> Witnessing a North-South instability continuum, 
Europeans and Americans should change their 
strategic approach and envision North Africa and 
the Sahel-Saharan strip as one dynamic area, 
enlarging the geographical scope of their anti-terror 
activities to a ‘G5+’ including Libya and Algeria. 
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First addressing the origins of the current security crisis in the 
Sahel and the security continuum with North Africa, this 
policy brief focuses on the central role played by France and 
the European Union (EU) and argues that the G5 Sahel was 
from the start conceived with military ambitions. It then 
assesses the growing transatlantic rift between European and 
American sponsors regarding their respective security-
focused approaches to the region. It concludes that, to be 
adequate, a counter-terrorism strategy in the Sahel needs to 
reinforce domestic  social cohesion and police missions, while 
being more comprehensive through an expansion of its 
geographical scope. 
Terrorism in the Sahel: a geographically diffuse problem 
Algeria and Libya: the North Africa – Sahel continuum 
Africa’s continental crossroad, the Sahel was a propitious 
ground for a security crisis under the pressure of jihadi groups 
and unbridled weapon flows originating from North Africa.  
It is first necessary to consider the important role that Libya 
has played as a strategic hub for terrorist groups operating in 
the Sahel. The rapid fall of the Qaddafi regime, following the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) operation in 2011, 
catalysed the development of terrorism and the collapse of 
already weak state structures in neighbouring Sahel 
countries. In the absence of a post-intervention strategy, the 
Libyan territory was left without state control. Initially in the 
hands of both pro- and anti-Qaddafi groups, small arms and 
weapons began to circulate to fragile bordering states of the 
Sahel, where terrorist organisations could  easily access them 
to exploit existing ethnic and sectarian tensions.  
More importantly, the influence of groups originating from 
bordering North African states played a central role in the 
eruption of terrorist groups in the Sahel. Al-Qaida in Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM), in particular, was created in Algeria in 2003, 
as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Experiencing 
difficulties to establish itself in Algeria, since 2009 it has 
focused particularly on Northern Mali, taking advantage of 
the weak control of the Malian government over the territory 
and Tuareg populations’ separatist aspirations. Joining the 
Tuareg tribes of the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (MNLA) in their rebellion against Bamako in 2012, 
AQIM, together with Ansar al-Dine and the Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa, rapidly marginalised the MNLA 
and became the main concern for state authorities.   
A response complicated by the reconfiguration of the jihadi 
landscape and the absence of regional leadership 
In the last two decades, the Sahel has witnessed the 
emergence of a patchwork of parallel groups often 
competing with each other. However, a milestone was 
reached in March 2017 with the merger of four groups – 
namely AQIM’s Saharan branch, Ansar Din, Al-Murabitun and 
the Macina Liberation Front – under the banner of the Group 
in Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM). By joining forces, 
these terrorist groups have gained in coherence and 
effectiveness. In spite of their allegiance to the broader al-
Qaeda jihadism, this merger also confirms the local rooting of 
terrorism in the Sahel, which is proven by the choice of 
Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghaly – founder of Ansar Dine – as the 
GSIM leader. Although this group is still ideologically rivalled 
by the ISIS-affiliated Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, a 
strategic convergence between both cannot be totally 
excluded. The risk is also that jihadist movements continue 
their territorial expansion in both West Africa and Libya, and 
that they grow with the return of fighters from the Middle 
East.  
Faced with this lifting of barriers between terrorist factions, 
the response remains challenging. Moreover, regional actors 
such as Algeria have proven reluctant when it comes to a 
regionalized military response. Even though, Algeria has 
played a leading role in the Mali Peace Process, particularly 
through the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement on Northern Mali, 
and is ready to contribute to the stabilization of the wider 
region, Algerian cooperation with the G5 remains limited. 
Algiers maintains its suspicions regarding the setup of a joint 
force, insisting on not intervening outside its borders “due to 
constitutional, historical and doctrinal reasons” (Lounnas 
2018: 5). Such a limited commitment to the regionalisation of 
counter-terrorism contrasts with the progressive assertion of 
the G5 as a key actor, illustrated by the French and broader 
European support to its setup. 
Backing the G5 Sahel: Europeanising France’s efforts 
French parentage, military focus  
Created in February 2014 with a light institutional 
architecture, the G5 Sahel was initially designed as a 
framework for coordinating and monitoring existing regional 
cooperation and international initiatives – including the 
European Union and the African Union (AU) – while coupling 
and bolstering security and development initiatives. Although 
it was not established as a security organisation, the G5 Sahel 
had from the start a strong military focus. Even before it was 
officially created, a meeting of the heads of military staff of 
the five Sahel countries in July 2013 marked the starting point 
of enhanced cooperation on border management in order to 
bolster stability in the region.  
The origins of the G5 are also to be found in the progressive 
reconfiguration of the French strategy, towards greater 
geographical comprehensiveness in the Sahel. France 
launched operation Serval following UN Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 2085 in December 2012, in response to 
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Bamako’s request for military assistance. Serval was designed 
as an operation limited in time and resources. It ultimately 
stopped the offensive and liberated Northern Mali in 2013. 
However, as of 2014, violence resurged locally, leading to 
considerable numbers of internally displaced people. After 
the Malian Army was defeated at Kidal in Northern Mali, the 
withdrawal of Serval was suspended in May 2014. Witnessing 
a multiplication of fronts, France ended Serval in Mali and 
Epervier in Chad (an operation that had lasted since 1986) in 
August 2014 and launched operation Barkhane, tasked with 
eradicating terrorist groups in Chad, Mali and Niger.  
Barkhane was a first response to the fluid geopolitical setting 
of the region. However, with the fight having been 
geographically extended to a territory as large as Europe, 
France had to look for extra capacity and found a relay to its 
action in the G5.  
Operationalising a regionalised strategy 
Even though the project of a Joint Force gained support from 
the international community, an agreement on its funding, 
and hence operationalisation, was more difficult to reach. 
Facing a deteriorating situation in central Mali, bordering 
Burkina Faso and Niger, the G5 Sahel took an important step 
forward in February 2017, when the heads of state of its 
member countries decided to reactivate the project of a G5 
Joint Force. Officially launched together with French 
President Macron in Bamako in July 2017, the joint force aims 
to support Barkhane and the MINUSMA by leading cross-
border operations against terrorists but also organised crime 
and human traffickers. Although backed by the AU and the 
EU, subsequent debates at the UNSC were marked by US 
reluctance vis-à-vis the project, which led to a minimal 
political agreement without further agreeing on the funding 
of the force (MEAE 2018).  
The High-Level Conference in Brussels in February 2018 
constituted a watershed for the operationalisation of the 
Joint Force and the perennation of the G5 as such – 
announcing €414 million of financial assistance, including 
€176 million from the EU and its member states, among 
which €100 million from the African Peace Facility (European 
Commission 2018b). Nevertheless, it merely represents a 
continuation of France’s efforts, after the first military 
operations launched late October 2017, UNSC Resolution 
2391 which authorised the MINUSMA’s logistical support to 
the force, and the Conference at La Celle Saint-Cloud in 
December 2017. The latter indeed succeeded in confirming 
national financial commitment by G5 members, and in 
unlocking support from the EU and its member states, but 
also from the US ($60 million of bilateral assistance for the 
States of the Joint Force), Saudi Arabia ($100 million) and the 
United Arab Emirates ($30 million).  
By bringing the question of political and operational support 
to the Joint Force at both the EU and UN levels, and making 
multilateralism and support to the MINUSMA a priority, the 
G5 has arguably led France towards a progressive 
Europeanisation of its Sahel policy. 
Today, the Sahel Alliance – launched by France, Germany and 
the EU together in July 2017 – serves as a ‘coordination hub’ 
to accompany the G5 and embodies the ‘international 
development assistance’ aspect of the ‘security-development 
nexus’ of counter-terrorism policies. Bringing together France 
and Germany, the EU, the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank, the UN Development Programme, Italy, 
Spain, the United Kingdom, the Alliance remains open to 
other contributors (MEAE 2018). The absence of the US adds 
to the notion of a growing transatlantic rift reinforced by 
Washington’s skepticism regarding the Joint Force displayed 
in the UNSC. 
The transatlantic rift: American disinterest vs European 
transformative regionalism  
A growing transatlantic rift 
Contrasting with the EU sponsorship of the G5 and despite a 
$60 million American pledge in support of the Force, the US 
is the ‘great absentee’ in the Sahel. Yet, certain past 
initiatives, established in the ‘Global War on Terror’ context, 
had focused on the region under the successive Clinton, Bush 
Jr. and Obama administrations. However, a project such as 
the Pan-Sahel Initiative was crippled by a lack of consistency 
among US departments and agencies, and by a “securitisation 
of Washington’s Africa policy” which led to a “militarization 
of the continent” (Oyebade 2018: 795-796; Adebajo 2018: 
28). Later incorporated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership, it ultimately vanished in the US military’s Africa 
Command (AFRICOM).   
Arguably, the US reaction to the French proposal at the UNSC 
was for a large part due to the fact that the debate erupted 
at a lynchpin moment in the US over its presence in the region 
after four US Army soldiers had been killed in a terrorist 
ambush in Niger. Considering that the region is not critically 
important economically, and that it is rather improbable that 
terrorist groups and traffic emanating from the Sahel would 
attain US territory, the Sahel will not come on top of the 
Trump administration’s agenda any time soon. Nevertheless, 
the fact that US Ambassadors to Sahel countries are all career 
diplomats and not political appointees highlights to what 
extent bilateral relationships are considered significant and 
challenging, and the difficulty not to lose ground in a region 
where the weakness of institutions makes personal 
relationships crucial factors of diplomatic success.  
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More generally, the Trump administration’s African policy has 
remained blurred by the President’s ambiguous rhetoric and 
the Department of State’s lack of a clear vision, thus widening 
the transatlantic rift. Besides the US President’s use of the 
term “shithole countries” to qualify African nations, the 
current administration lacks a proper African policy: the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs was nominated 
only in May 2018, a year and a half after Trump’s 
inauguration; at this point, the US still has no ambassador in 
major African countries such as South Africa; Africa is 
mentioned last in the latest National Security Strategy; and 
where US Secretary of State Tillerson’s tour in Africa could 
have advanced US-African relations, it ended up being a one-
way journey – as Tillerson was fired the minute he came back 
to Washington.   
This lack of interest of the US in the Sahel and more generally 
Africa has allowed Europeans to assume more of a leadership 
position within the US-EU-West Africa triangle. 
A French-driven European leadership favoured by US 
disinterest 
To a large extent, “transatlantic cooperation in Africa is 
basically about collaboration between the United States and 
France, and not between the US and the European Union“ 
(Olsen 2018: 1-2). Hence, the fact that the US thanked France 
but no other partner when reaching an agreement at the 
UNSC (US Department of State 2017) represents a straight 
continuation of the mutually beneficial cost- and task-sharing 
between Washington and Paris: the US backs France’s 
‘gendarme’ role politically and logistically – as for the 
intervention in Mali in 2013 –, whereas the presence of 
French military forces allows the US for maintaining 
‘American boots on the ground’ at a minimum. Nonetheless, 
the current US administration’s disavowal of multilateralism, 
its will to make budget cuts in development aid and UN 
peacekeeping missions, its posture on migration and poor 
consideration of Africa present the risk of jeopardizing US 
allies’ efforts.  
Although the Middle East remains the main site of 
geopolitical tensions at the EU’s doorstep, contrary to the US, 
the EU’s ambitions to be an actor in world politics start with 
a leading role in Africa. This is particularly true in the Sahel 
where the EU has asserted itself as the first partner in peace 
and security, through prevention, mediation and 
peacekeeping, but also by contributing to multilateral 
initiatives and building partnerships. This tends to be 
confirmed by the centrality of CSDP missions in the security 
architecture of countries like Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUTM 
Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the active political 
and financial support to the Mali peace process. The creation 
of the G5 Sahel coincided with the extension of the EU Sahel 
Strategy to Burkina Faso and Chad (Council of the EU 2014) 
and allowed the EU to reinforce its actorness in the region by 
political, developmental, and humanitarian means (see 
European Commission 2018a).  
The building of a comprehensive approach to the Sahel and a 
strong EU-G5 bond followed a two-step process which has 
highlighted differences with the US. Confronted with the 
reality of terrorism within and outside Europe and the inter-
connectedness between the two, the EU progressively 
developed a unitary approach to countering terrorism both 
domestically and abroad. Following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, 
which allowed for the combination of CSDP elements with 
development and humanitarian instruments, the EU started 
to draw up the blueprint of a comprehensive approach. 
Hence, in its 2011 Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel – designed and published before the start of the 
current crisis –, the European External Action Service 
underlined the necessity of a “regional, integrated and 
holistic strategy” (EEAS 2011: 2). Today, with the G5 Sahel 
playing the role of a regional forum but also of a single 
interlocutor for external actors, the EU disposes of the means 
to actually implement what was defined as a transformative 
partnership-based approach. 
Conclusion 
Most of the past European and American approaches to 
instability in the Sahel lacked a comprehensive understanding 
of terrorism and its roots, and notably the inter-linkage 
between development issues, bad governance and 
corruption. Terrorism in the Sahel-Saharan strip is less the 
violent expression of religious extremism than that of social, 
economic and political frustration. Catalysed by public 
authorities’ corruption and an increase in confessionalisation 
mixed with long-established ethnic tensions, this frustration  
transforms the path towards radicalisation into a form of 
social movement. At the same time, international presence 
and sponsorship to state military initiatives in the Sahel 
contribute to reinforcing terrorists’ legitimacy.  
Against this backdrop, it is extremely difficult to pursue a 
“comprehensive” approach or “integrated” response to 
terrorism in the Sahel given that this has to pass by a 
reassertion of nation-states, while considering the social, 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the region, the plurality 
of threats and the permeability of territories that require 
cross-border synergies.  
Past approaches to the Sahel also suffered from a low level of 
coordination in the making and implementation of response 
strategies. If the set-up of a joint force could be interpreted 
as premature or a hasty exit strategy for Barkhane, the G5 
Sahel still has considerable potential for building resilience at 
the national level, and synergies and political dialogue at the 
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broader regional level. However, it cannot function without 
international support in the medium term. 
The analysis leads to a set of operational and strategic 
recommendations. At the operational level, it becomes 
necessary to empower the G5 towards more autonomy. 
However, the sole Joint Force neither has the capacities nor 
the mandate to operate further than border areas and target 
the very core of terrorist networks. 
- Considering the geographical presence of the threat, G5 
member states’ domestic security should be reinforced 
through an increased external support for and 
cooperation – notably regarding training – with domestic 
police missions as a complement to cross-border military 
cooperation. 
- Considering the hybrid nature and cross-border structure 
of the threat, the Joint Force’s flexibility should also be 
increased through further integration with Barkhane and 
the MINUSMA. 
- Considering the need for political autonomy and 
legitimacy in the eyes of populations, the Joint Force 
should be granted a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter by the UNSC – which has been considered in the 
Communiqué by the Co-Chairs of the High-Level 
Conference (European Commission 2018b), while 
national and local authorities must take steps to offer an 
alternative by strengthening social cohesion, notably 
through an increased dialogue with local and civil society 
actors, including religious ones. 
At the strategic level, the reality of the North-South axis 
requires the response to instability to be more geographically 
comprehensive. 
- Considering the Sahara as a natural barrier, North Africa 
has long been envisioned in Europe and the US as part of 
the ‘Middle-East and North Africa’ or confused with the 
‘Arab-Islamic World’, without including countries of the 
Sahel-Saharan strip. Beyond this compartmentalised 
approach, sub-regions such as the Sahel or the Horn of 
Africa should be perceived as part of greater North African 
dynamics. Europe and the US might need to review the 
way they envision the Sahel and the whole Northern half 
of the African continent. 
- As a forum, the G5 Sahel should be scaled-up to a ‘G5+’ 
and further integrate key neighbouring countries, above 
all Algeria and Libya. 
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